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I.

Introduction and Background

A global consensus has emerged as to a set of general principles to which secured
transactions law for personal property should adhere. I refer to these as the Modern

2

Principles of Secured Transactions Law (or Modern Principles).1 The sources of the
Modern Principles include UCC Article 92 and its many progeny, including the 2016
UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions3 (UNCITRAL Model Law) and its
antecedent UNCITRAL texts.4 This chapter seeks to situate the Modern Principles into
the more general sphere of the transplantation of law from one system to another. In
particular, the chapter considers the adoption of the Modern Principles by States through
the lens of the late Alan Watson’s pathbreaking book, Legal Transplants.5 Insights
provided by Legal Transplants and its various adherents and critics offer an interesting
and useful heuristic for examining the legal transplantation of the Modern Principles.6
The process of enactment (or the failure to enact) Modern Principles-based laws
plays a crucial role in transplantation. That process must negotiate various political
obstacles and incentives, such as the positions of organizations and individuals with
entrenched interests, governmental encouragement and discouragement, attitudes of legal
elites, and sometimes the fortuitous intervention of particular individuals who champion
(or oppose) the reforms. Moreover, an important focus for any analysis of transplantation
of the Modern Principles is whether and to what extent laws embracing the Modern
Principles, even if enacted, are actually used and accepted. The same factors that have an
impact on the success or failure of the enactment process also may influence
transplantation through the post-enactment use and acceptance of such laws.
In a recent article I advocate studies that would take ‘a more systematic approach
to the use—and memorialization in the literature—of experiences and lessons learned
from work of individuals and organizations “on the ground” in the process of
implementing [secured transactions law and insolvency law] reforms.’7 That article
1

For an overview of the Modern Principles and their principal sources, see part II below.
UCC Article 9 (Secured Transactions) (American Law Institute and Uniform Law Commission 2017).
3
UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016) (UNCITRAL Model Law).
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.pdf.
4
The Model Law was inspired by its predecessor, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions
(2007), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-0410English.pdf (‘UNCITRAL Legislative Guide’). In July 2017 UNCITRAL approved the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Secured Transactions Guide to Enactment,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/MLST_Guide_to_enactment_E.pdf (‘UNCITRAL
GTE’).
5
A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens and London, University of
Georgia Press, 1974, 2nd edn 1993).
6
For an enlightening and important study that takes a different approach to the study of transplantation of
the principles embedded in modern secured transactions laws, see RJ Wood, ‘Identifying Borrowed
Sources in Secured Transactions Law Reform’ (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Wood
undertakes to ‘fingerprint’ personal property security legislation in jurisdictions around the globe to
determine ‘the extent to which the jurisdiction has borrowed from each of . . . three templates’—UCC
Article 9, the Canada/New Zealand model, and the Model Law. Professor Wood’s illuminating study will
be a mandatory resource for the future examination and understanding of secured transactions law reforms.
7
See CW Mooney Jr ‘Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement and Enforcement Mechanism: A Closer
Look at Global Modernization of Secured Transactions Laws’ (2018) 27 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy
Law and Practice 673.
2
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reaffirms earlier work that articulated the significant impact of insolvency law on the
behaviour of market participants outside actual or anticipated insolvency proceedings and
the important role of insolvency law (and the actual use of insolvency proceedings in a
given market) on the effectiveness of secured transactions laws.8 It also elaborates on the
crucial importance of private international law rules (ie, choice-of-law rules) for secured
transactions. And it argues that such rules are vital for the operation of secured
transactions in the business credit markets and should be an integral part of the adoption
and implementation of the Modern Principles.
While much of the discussion here may be applicable to consumer credit (ie,
credit extended to natural persons for personal, family, or household purposes), the focus
here is on the Modern Principles in the context of business credit.9 The studies that I
propose derive from some hypotheses. One is that incorporation of the Modern
Principles into a State’s legal regime is a necessary—but not a sufficient—condition for a
successful transplantation. Rephrasing this hypotheses in a more familiar vernacular:
putting the Modern Principles ‘on the books’ will have little or no impact if the system is
not actually used. Another is that successful transplantation of the Modern Principles
into a given State’s laws may depend on (sometimes sui generis) adaptations of and
adjustments to the legal environment and business credit markets of the adopting State as
well as modifications of the substance of the Modern Principles themselves.
The adoption of the Modern Principles need not be seen as an ‘ultimate’ goal.
Rather, it is adequate access to credit that holds the most promise for enhancing social
welfare. But access to credit does not necessarily depend on a market for secured credit
(i.e., a market for credit which is conditional on the effective provision of collateral) or
the adoption of the Modern Principles. So an important goal should be not merely the
adoption of the Modern Principles but the development and support for a robust market
for credit and an assessment of whether and how adoption of the Modern Principles can
facilitate such a market. For example, if there exists a robust and accessible market for
credit without collateral (or without the Modern Principles), then imposition of the
Modern Principle legal regime may not have major, transformative effects on credit
markets. On the other hand, adoption of Modern Principles-based laws may offer
substantial benefits aside from such material market effects.10
These qualifications notwithstanding, the ‘overall objective’ of the Modern
Principles, as reflected by the Model Law and related UNCITRAL texts, ‘is to increase
the availability and decrease the cost of credit by providing for an effective and efficient

8

CW Mooney Jr, ‘Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement: Insolvency-Related Provisions of the Cape
Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol’ (2004) 13 International Insolvency Review, 27, 3439.
9
As mentioned in ch 1, II, business credit is the focus of this book.
10
See V below.
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secured transactions law.’ 11 The same can be said of the Cape Town Convention
(‘CTC’) 12 and its Protocols. 13 Several studies and overwhelming empirical evidence
confirm that the CTC and Aircraft Protocol have fulfilled this objective.14 While the
Aircraft Protocol may be sui generis in its strikingly demonstrable effects, the adoption of
the UNCITRAL texts and the ongoing Modern Principles-influenced global reforms
demonstrate that at least an important segment of expert opinion subscribes to the general
effectiveness of Modern Principles-based laws for these purposes. Consequently, this
chapter proceeds on the general premise that adoption of the Modern Principles promotes
social welfare as a general matter and is a worthy goal to be pursued. But the adoption of
the Modern Principles does not necessarily contemplate the enactment of any particular
statutory text—whether that might be based on Article 9, the Model Law, or any other
model or template.
Following this Introduction, part II outlines the substance of the Modern
Principles and their antecedents. Part III then summarizes relevant aspects of Watson’s
Legal Transplants and the positions of some significant adherents and critics of his theses
and conclusions. It explains the potential relevance and utility of Watson’s historical
perspectives for the practical context of transplantation of the Modern Principles. With
this background, part IV considers the transplantation of the Modern Principles from
several of the most important perspectives, including the role of legal elites and legal
culture, governmental and regulatory influences, opposition of entrenched interests, the
role of insolvency law and proceedings, registration in public registries, descriptions of
collateral in the context of registration and creation of security interests, and the market
for business credit. In particular, it addresses various impediments to the adoption of the
Modern Principles by States, obstacles to the use and acceptance of Modern Principles11

UNCITRAL GTE II., para 4.
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 2001, 2307 UNTS 285 (‘CTC’).
13
Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to
Aircraft Equipment 2001, 2367 UNTS 517 (Aircraft Protocol). Since entering into force on March1, 2006,
the CTC and Aircraft Protocol have been adopted by 77 contracting States and one regional economic
integration organization (European Union). UNIDROIT, Status of the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown, accessed 5 Jan. 2018). The
Protocols covering railway rolling stock and space assets are not yet in force. These are the Luxembourg
Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway
Rolling Stock, 2007, 46 ILM 662; Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets (adopted 9 March 2012). A fourth Protocol covering
mining, agricultural, and construction equipment has recently been adopted (see https://macprotocol.info
See UNIDROIT, Report (Nov. 2017), https://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2017/study72k/cge02/s72k-cge02-report-e.pdf; see eg R Goode, Official Commentary to the Convention on International Interests
in Mobile Equipment and Protocol Thereto on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, 2.1, at 13 (Rome:
UNIDROIT, 3d edn 2013) (‘A sound, internationally adopted legal regime for security, title-retention and
leasing interests will encourage the provision of finance and leasing and reduce its cost.’).
14
CW Mooney Jr, ‘The Cape Town Convention’s Improbable-but-Possible Progeny Part Two: Bilateral
Investment Treaty-Like Enforcement Mechanism’ (2015) 55 Virginia Journal of International Law 451,
454-58 (summarizing economic studies and CTC Discount, under which debtors located in CTC/Aircraft
Protocol jurisdictions can receive substantial discounts on costs of financing).
12
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based laws in the markets for business credit, and hurdles for both adoption and use. Part
V explains that the Modern Principles offer potential benefits other than the measurable
expansion of access to credit and the lowering of the cost of credit, such as coherence,
certainty, and ease of application and use. This is an important consideration that
generally has been overlooked or underappreciated. Part VI then concludes the Chapter.

II.

The modern principles of secured transactions law

The UNCITRAL Model Law epitomizes the Modern Principles. It is a relatively
direct descendant of the Legislative Guide,15 UCC Article 9 16 and the various PPSAs
adopted by Canadian Provinces.17 The Modern Principles are reflected as well in other
model laws,18 in other secured transactions laws enacted by several States during recent
years,19 and in laws that are currently being considered by other States.20 The Modern

15

UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.
By any measure UCC Article 9 has been an enormously successful legislative achievement. From its
original promulgation in 1954 through several major revisions it has been adopted in all United States
jurisdictions in substantially uniform fashion. Significantly, Article 9’s principles have been emulated and
adopted outside of the United States. This is evidenced by the influence of these principles on the laws
actually adopted in other jurisdictions and on international harmonization efforts.
17
See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (OPPSA).
18
See, e.g., EBRD, Model Law on Secured Transactions (2004),
http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/guides/model-law-on-secured-transactions.html; Organization of
American States, Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions,
https://www.oas.org/dil/Model_Law_on_Secured_Transactions.pdf.
19
E.g., Colombia, Ley No.1676 del 20 de Agosto de 2014, Por la Cual se Promueve el Acceso al Crédito y
se Dictan Normas sobre Garantías Mobiliarias; See Mayer Brown, ‘Colombia’s New Law on Security
Interest over Movable Assets Comes into Effect’ (28 April 2014),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/4868229b-de56-4b53-8669a55fcfdd728a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/56e374b9-fab3-467f-b3b1aa1d67beafbb/Update_New_Regulations_Moveable_Assets_Colombia_0414.pdf; Jordan, Pakistan; E-Mail
from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (June 18,
2018, 03:01 EDT) (on file with author). In Africa, reforms that have taken place based completely, or near
completely, on the Modern Principles include those in Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, Rwanda
and Zimbabwe. Reform which partially reflects the Modern Principles has taken place in Ghana, Sierra
Leone, Burundi and Ethiopia, see M. Dubovec & L. Gullifer, Secured Transactions Law Reform in Africa,
ch. 2 (Hart 2019). In Asia, Brunei (ch 16) and the Philippines (ch 11) have introduced reforms based on the
Modern Principles, while other reforms eg India (ch 18) partially reflect them (for analysis, see ch 18
(India) V.
20
These states currently include, e.g., Bahrain, Bangladesh (see ch 17) Pakistan (see ch 19), Chile,
Paraguay, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, and Tunisia. E-Mail from Andres F. Martinez, Senior Financial Sector
Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (July 1, 2017, 08:34 EDT) (on file with author); E-Mail
from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (July 1, 2017,
07:41 EDT) (on file with author); E-Mail from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World
Bank Group, to CW Mooney Jr (June 18, 2018, 03:01 EDT) (on file with author).
16
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Principles also are embodied in the enormously successful CTC and Aircraft Protocol as
well as the other CTC Protocols.21
There is no definitive or ‘official’ version of the Modern Principles. However,
the Legislative Guide describes its “fundamental legal policies.”22 The EBRD and the
WBG each has published their own synthesized and distilled versions as well.23 Based
on the available statutory texts mentioned above as well as the Legislative Guide, WBG,
and EBRD principles, I propose to include in the Modern Principles the following
features:24
(i)
public notice as a general condition for third-party effectiveness
(perfection), including (x) a grantor identifier-based registry for
registration of notices of security interests, and (y) possession of tangible
assets;
(ii)

clear and easy to achieve methods for creation of security interests;

(iii)

clear and predictable priority rules, including the general effectiveness of
security interests in insolvency proceedings and priority of security
interests over other interests;

(iv)

provision for effective enforcement of security interests following a
debtor’s default, including extrajudicial enforcement;

(v)

availability of all types of personal property as collateral, including future
assets securing future obligations;

(vi)

free assignability of receivables;

(vii)

comprehensive coverage of all forms of security devices;

(viii) extension of security interests to the proceeds of collateral;

21

Note, however, that although these instruments adopt an object-based registry rather than a grantor
identifier-based registry, as contemplated by the Modern Principles. See eg CTC art. 18 (registration
requirements).
22
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 22-26.
23
EBRD, ‘Core Principles for a Secured Transactions Law’, https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/legalreform/access-to-finance/transactions.html (EBRD Principles); WBG, ‘Principles for Effective Insolvency
and Creditor/Debtor Regimes’, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-world-bankprinciples-for-effective-insolvency-and-creditor-rights (WBG Principles). Professor Wood also has
summarized a set of ‘operational principles’ that ‘provide the foundational building blocks’ of secured
transactions law reform. RJ Wood, n xr above, 7.
24
All of these principles are discussed and explained in great detail elsewhere. See eg UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide.
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(ix)

the general acceptance of freedom of contract for inter-party relations;

(x)

general equality of treatment of creditors providing acquisition financing;

(xi)

clear private international law (choice-of-law) rules.

Other important principles embraced by the Model Law and other modern iterations of
secured transactions laws are implicit in and follow as a part of the policy penumbra of
these features.25

III.

Legal transplantation: Alan Watson’s Legal Transplants
and its relevance for the modern principles

The analysis offered here draws on Watson’s Legal Transplants not as a ‘how to’
for transplanting law—which certainly was not Watson’s aspiration—but as a heuristic.
The discussion aspires to offer a useful and accessible means of exploring legal
transplantation in general and the transplantation of the Modern Principles in particular.
Given this chapter’s premise that the successful transplantation of the Modern Principles
is on balance beneficial, Watson provides insights on both the practical and theoretical
planes. It is important to bear in mind that a successful transplant would require not only
the incorporation of the Modern Principles into the local law, typically by legislation, but
the actual use and application of Modern Principles-based law in transactional settings.
In particular, Watson’s work provides some guidance for areas of inquiry in future
investigations of law reform processes. Part IV considers these insights in addressing the
challenges, successes, and failures of transplanting the most important elements of the
Modern Principles.
Watson views comparative law as the ‘study of the relationship, above all the
historical relationship, between legal systems or between rules of more than one
system.’26 But the primary focus here is not the dissection of the discipline of
comparative law but rather the process of transplantation of law to (ie the borrowing of
25
I have not proposed to include as Modern Principles increasing access to credit and lowering the cost of
credit, although these are included in both the EBRD and WBG Principles. See EBRD Principle 1; WBG
Principle A3. Although these goals and aspirations of the Modern Principles certainly are important,
adoption of the Modern Principles is not the exclusive means for achieving them. Moreover, the Modern
Principles may serve other purposes as well. See part V below. I propose to include in the Modern
Principles only the relevant attributes of legal regimes. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide observes this
distinction between the objectives of a secured transactions regime and the legal policies designed to
achieve them. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 22.
26
Watson, Legal Transplants, 9.

8

law by) a State. Watson analyzes the historical instances of legal transplants throughout
the world, from ancient Near Eastern provisions regarding a goring ox27 to Roman law in
Scotland28 and Holland29 to English law in New Zealand.30 Watson makes the case—and
makes it convincingly—that transplanting individual rules of law or larger parts of legal
systems is extremely common, and that most changes in legal systems are the result of
borrowing.31
Watson contends that transplanting legal rules is socially easy—even with
opposition from the legal establishment or the legislature.32 ‘[I]t remains true that legal
rules move easily and are accepted into the system without too great difficulty . . . even
when the rules come from a very different kind of system.’33 He concludes that legal
rules are not usually ‘peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they . . .
operate and also that this is not a matter for great concern.’34 Watson also emphasizes the
overwhelming importance of authority for transplantation and for law generally.35 In
examining a legal system’s receipt of a transplant Watson encourages attention to how a
system diverges from other, donor systems, not to the overall system, in order to
determine what led a State to voluntarily seek and adopt the transplant.36 Significantly,
Watson questions the extent to which adjustments made by recipient States actually
conform law to fit their particular situations, arguing that the more important point is ‘the
psychological value of having [a State’s] . . . own legal system’.37
It is not surprising that the book has been widely critiqued. Perhaps the most
controversial aspects of Watson’s theories are his conclusion that transplanting laws is
socially easy and his failure to consider social variables surrounding legal transplants.38
Sir Otto Kahn-Freund in particular criticized Watson’s lack of concern with the society
that generated the transplanted law.39 By only presenting individual instances of legal

27

Ibid, 22.
Ibid, 44.
29
Ibid, 57.
30
Ibid, 74.
31
Ibid, 96.
32
Ibid, 95.
33
Ibid, 95-96. He concludes that ‘it would be a relatively easy task to frame a basic code of private law to
operate throughout, with each nation being left free to modify for itself any part it found not to its liking.’
Ibid, 100-01.
34
Ibid, 96.
35
Ibid. In support, Watson argues that reception is possible and easy even when the receiving society is
less materially and culturally advanced, and that foreign law may be influential even when ‘totally
misunderstood’. Ibid., 99.
36
Ibid, 97.
37
Ibid, 101.
38
Ibid, discussing R Seidman, ‘Book Review’ (1975) 55 Boston University Law Review 682, 682-83.
39
O Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1. KahnFreund strongly disagreed with Watson’s conclusions about the ease of transplanting laws, and claimed that
borrowing law required understanding of the system from which the rules were being borrowed. Ibid; see J
28
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transplants into recipient countries, Watson may not have captured the full picture.40 But
Watson emphasized that it was primarily the idea of a foreign law that is being
transplanted.41 Many scholars agree that for a legal transplant to ‘fit in’ with the
importing system, that system will need to be adaptive and receptive to different
socioeconomic conditions, which requires taking notice of social, economic, and cultural
conditions in both the importing and donating country.42
Criticisms notwithstanding, Legal Transplants continues to have ‘legs’ in the
world of comparative law. Legal Transplants has been described as a ‘landmark book’
and a ‘“seminal” text’ of comparative law.43 For example, Meryl Dean has drawn upon
Watson’s transplant theory but with refinements in her study of the jury trial in Japan.44
In another refinement, Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt, in their study of the
transplantation of the corporate director’s duty of loyalty from US law to Japanese law,
argue that the success of a legal transplant turns on whether there is a ‘“fit” between the
imported rule and the host environment’.45
The goal here is not a critique of Watson’s theory and methodology. It is instead
the use of Legal Transplants as a heuristic and metaphor for assessing the transplantation

Cairns, ‘Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’ (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International
and Comparative Law 637, 644-45.
40
Watson, among other comparative law scholars, ‘missed an equally important phenomenon – the impact
of the process on the “donor” country.’ F Foster, ‘American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror’ (2010) 94
Minnesota Law Review 602, 607.
41
Watson responded to Kahn-Freund:
What, in my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at foreign systems was an idea which
could be transformed into part of the law of his country. For this a systematic knowledge of the law or
political structure of the donor system was not necessary, though a law reformer with such knowledge
would be more efficient. Successful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing was known of the
political, social or economic context of the foreign law.
A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79.
42
W Shi, ‘Globalization and Indigenization: Legal Transplant of a Universal TRIPS Regime in a
Multicultural World’ (2010) 47 American Business Law Journal 455, 456. Inga Markovits has conceded
that Watson is correct about the ease of legal transplants, but only in the case of self-executing law reforms
that do not need popular approval or compliance to gain effect. I Markovits, ‘Exporting Law Reform – But
Will It Travel?’ (2004) 37 Cornell International Law Journal 95, 98. Generally, however, in her view these
are not the type of laws in question, and most legal reforms require cooperation from the citizenry and
cultural harmony between the donor and recipient to become effective. Ibid, 99.
43
Cairns, 641-42.
44
M Dean, ‘Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 570.
45
H Kanda and C Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese
Corporate Law’ (2004) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 887, 891. The authors view ‘success’ in
this context as the ‘use of the imported legal rule in the same way that it is used in the home country,
subject to adaptations to local conditions.’ Ibid, 890. ‘[F]ailure’ in their view ‘occurs when the imported
rule is ignored by relevant actors in the host country, or the application and enforcement of the rule lead to
unintended consequences.’ Ibid. They explain: ‘“Fit” might be thought of as having two components-micro and macro. Micro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the preexisting legal infrastructure
in the host country. Macro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the preexisting institutions of the
political economy in the host country.’ Ibid, 891.
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of the Modern Principles. For example, Watson compares law to technology, offering the
wheel as a useful metaphor.46

IV.

Transplantation (or not) of the modern principles in context

It seems abundantly clear that the Modern Principles can be successfully
transplanted. Adoptions in Canada and more recently in New Zealand and Australia,
adoptions and introductions in other States,47 and the acceptance of the Modern
Principles in various international harmonization projects (the UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide and Model Law being the principle examples) and their ongoing influence on
global reform efforts attest to this conclusion. But what of the situations in which the
Modern Principles have not been successfully transplanted notwithstanding efforts to do
so? And what of the situations in which substantial secured transactions law reforms
have been made but which do not follow the Modern Principles? And what of the
situations in which no meaningful attempts have been made to reform secured
transactions law, much less to embrace the Modern Principles? This part explores some
more and less successful aspects of the transplantation of the Modern Principles. In
considering secured transactions law reforms it may be useful to imagine Watson’s
‘wheel’ metaphor in considering whether the Modern Principles offer a ‘fit’ for a
recipient (or would-be recipient) State and in the assessment of local adaptations.48 For
example, did a State ‘get’ the ‘idea’ of the Modern Principles to be transplanted? And
even if local adjustments are understandable from political and economic perspectives,
are the local adjustments and the justifications for the adjustments coherent?
The discussion draws in part on the country-specific chapters in this volume. It
also is inspired and informed in by an ongoing research project that I am currently
undertaking with two Japanese scholars.49 The project consists of a qualitative empirical
46

Watson explained:
[L]aw like technology is very much the fruit of human experience. Just as very few people have thought of
the wheel yet once invented its advantages can be seen and the wheel used by many, so important legal
rules are invented by a few people or nations, and once invented their value can readily be appreciated, and
the rules themselves adopted for the needs of many nations.
Watson, Legal Transplants, 100. It might be helpful to consider adaptations of the Modern Principles in
light of examples of possible positive and negative adaptations of the wheel. Positive examples are: rubber
tires (for smoothing out bumps), ball bearings (for relatively frictionless wheel rotation), and front-wheel
steering mechanisms (for steering through easy, rounded turns). Negative adaptations might include:
substitution of a flat, sleigh-like skid (fine perhaps for ice or snow, but difficult for sand, rocks, or other
rough surfaces), square or octagon wheels (possible to rotate, but bumpy and requiring much more power
than round versions, and a log- or tube-shaped single wheel instead of two opposite-side wheels (rotation is
adequate but heavy and involves much friction).
47
See nn xr above.
48
See text at note xr above.
49
My co-investigators are Megumi Hara (Professor of Law, Gakushuin University Law School), and
Kumiko Koens (Professor, Yamagata University Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Department of
Public Policy and Social Studies).
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study of business credit in Japan—the Japanese Business Credit Project (or ‘JBCP’)—
involving interviews of representatives of Japanese financial institutions, governmental
bodies, and businesses as well as legal professionals such as practitioners and academics.
Our goal is an assessment of Japanese markets for private business credit, including the
Japanese laws that govern secured transactions in tangible movables (such as a firm’s
inventory or business equipment) and claims (such as a firm’s accounts receivable) to
secure extensions of business credit. Among other aspects of the Japanese business credit
market, the study investigates underlying causes of Japan’s failure to embrace Modern
Principles.
This chapter also draws insight from invitational conferences on the coordination
of global reforms of secured transactions laws held in February 2017 and October 2018.50
Those conferences brought together individuals representing many of the most important
organizations that work on reforms of secured transactions laws and insolvency laws.
During the conferences several themes emerged. One overarching theme was that
enactment by a State of statutory reforms is insufficient of itself for successful
implementation of a modern secured transactions law. Another was that global reform
efforts would benefit greatly from increased coordination among the various
organizations involved with that work. Examples of coordination failures abounded.
Several problems associated with implementation of reforms were discussed. For
example, some States have received conflicting advice and have enacted secured
transactions laws that are not sufficiently compatible with newly adopted insolvency
laws. Some advisors present States with very simple, streamlined versions of secured
transactions laws that others consider hopelessly incomplete. Other advisors favour more
complete statutory approaches that some consider unnecessarily complex.
A clear consensus emerged that an important but enormously challenging obstacle
to reform is the need for capacity building—stimulation of the capacities of prospective
debtors and creditors to usefully and profitably employ secured transactions law reforms.
This would include steps such as consultations with and education of the various
stakeholders affected by secured transactions laws as well as cultural shifts in relevant
attitudes and social norms. 51 Of course, the foregoing offers only a taste of the
discussions. But a common thread appears to be that capacity building in various forms,
including fundamental and structural changes in characteristics of credit markets and
50

The 2017 Coordination Conference was held on February 9-10, 2017, at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, Philadelphia, PA. It was co-sponsored by the International Insolvency Institute (III), the
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (now, Kozolchyk National Law Center (NatLaw)), and
the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa. The 2018 Coordination Conference
was held in Madrid, October 16-17, 2018, co-sponsored by the III, NatLaw, and Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid.
51
See eg N Cohen, ‘Capacity Building as a Key Determinant of Success in Secured Transactions Reform’,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/4thSecTrans/Presentations/2ContGonST2/COHEN_Colloqui
um_Presentation.pdf.
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cultural and legal traditions and norms, are necessary conditions for successful
implementation of modern secured transactions laws. Enactment of statutory text, alone,
often may be a necessary but insufficient step.
One theme of this chapter is to advocate for further and more rigorous empirical
studies of secured transactions laws reforms. It makes no claim to have developed a
definitive set of conclusions about the transplantation of the Modern Principles. But it
does aspire instead to offer some useful guidance for the development of further
investigation. The following discussion in Subpart A addresses several challenges and
obstacles to transplantation of law in general and of the Modern Principles in particular.
These are impediments to the adoption of the Modern principles, to their effective use
and implementation even if adopted, or to both their adoption and use. Subpart B then
turns to several components of the Modern Principles. It addresses the impact and role of
the various obstacles to transplantation on these aspects of the Modern Principles.
Drawing on part III, Subpart C offers a ‘Watsonesque’ perspective on transplantation of
the Modern Principles.

A. Selected Challenges and Obstacles
i.

Impediments to Adoption of Modern Principles
a) The Fallacy of Expertise

Before focusing on a taxonomy of more specific obstacles to the adoption of the
Modern Principles and causes of relevant adjustments and deviations, it is useful to
reflect on an overarching impediment. I refer to this factor as the ‘Fallacy of Expertise’.
It is based on an aggregation of anecdotal observations and experiences over several
decades of involvement with commercial law reform efforts. It may be stated as a simple
syllogism relating to a proposal for a reform of legal rules from the perspective of a
person (below, ‘I’) occupying a position of formal or informal influence and whose views
are respected in the law reform process:
(i) I exercise my expertise competently to recognize the need to improve
the law and to propose any beneficial law reforms.
(ii) I did not think of the proposed law reform.
(iii) Therefore, the proposed law reform is not a good idea and should not
be adopted.
The problem with this silly little syllogism, of course, is that its first predicate
incorporates the term ‘competently’—not ‘perfectly’. It is all too rare an event for a
relevant expert to respond to a proposal—no matter how sound—with something like:
‘By golly, why didn’t I think of that? What a great idea!’ Of course, no one actually
‘admits’ reliance on the Fallacy. Moreover, I have no doubt that the Fallacy may be most
13

influential on the behaviour of those who have no subjective consciousness of its
operation and who, in the utmost good faith, rely on ‘objective’ and ‘rational’
argumentation, reasoning, and evidence.52 But most readers will easily recognize the
Fallacy when they see it and appreciate its operative role in the process.
b) Legal Elites, Legal Culture and Legal Concepts
In the realm of ‘technical’ aspects of private law doctrine—of which the Modern
Principles would generally be considered a part—experts among the legal elites often are
the most influential advisors and actors. This is understandable and, in many respects, is
a good thing. Experts among the legal elites (experienced and successful practitioners
and respected academics and judges) play an important role in adapting the prevailing
‘legal culture’ and ‘legal concepts’ to reforms such as the Modern Principles and in
making appropriate adjustments to those principles as well as reciprocal adjustments to
the local legal culture and concepts. Certainly such adaptations and adjustments may be
beneficial and important conditions for successful transplantation. And, as a practical
(read: political) matter, support or opposition from the legal community may be the most
important box to tick in the reform process. But this necessarily means that the legal
establishment also may be the most significant obstacle to reform.53
The role of the Fallacy of Expertise and the success or failure of resisting its
influence may be most obvious and significant among the legal elites. Legal
establishments in general appear to harbour great scepticism of changes perceived to be
fundamental,54 especially if advanced by ‘external’ sources.55 Reforms such as the
Modern Principles are agnostic inasmuch as they tend to conflict with both civil and
52

For example, consider Eric Berne’s metaphor in the context of script analysis of human behaviour:
‘[M]ost people spend their time sitting in front of a player piano going like this with their fingers and
saying, “How do you like the music I am making?”, under the delusion that they are making the music.’ E
Berne, ‘Transcription of Eric Berne in Vienna, 1968 IV International Congress of Group Psychotherapy’
(1973) III Transactional Analysis Journal 63, 68. The Fallacy sometimes may be a manifestation of the
Dunning-Kruger effect: ‘[W]hen people are incompetent in the strategies they adopt to achieve success and
satisfaction, they suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate
choices, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it.’ J Kruger and D Dunning, ‘Unskilled
and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated SelfAssessments’ (1999) 77 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1121.
53
See ch 8 (China) IVA and V (discussing resistance to revision of Civil Code and conservative attitude of
civil law scholars and drafters); ch 14 (Thailand) IV B and V B. [23, 32-33] (discussing resistance to
revision of Civil Code and Commercial Code); ch 13 (Taiwan) III B (conflicts with civil law traditions
hinders reforms). On the other hand, the need for more flexible systems of secured transactions has led to
judicially sanctioned systems of title transfer security in Japan and South Korea. See ch 10 (Japan) III A
(ii) (discussing jōto tanpo title transfer security); ch 12 (South Korea) II B (discussing yangdodambo title
transfer security).
54
See ibid.
55
See ch 14 (Thailand)VA (discussing view that compliance with international standards is not an adequate
basis for reform).
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common law doctrines and traditions.56 However, legal elites in some jurisdictions are
less accustomed than others to evaluating legal doctrine in terms of standards as specific
as economic efficiency or as general as social welfare. The ‘ought’ may be too often
gleaned from the ‘is’. ‘Reasons’ for resistance to reforms may be repeated over and over
with little rigorous analysis or debate, forming a difficult-to-penetrate-and-rebut
conventional wisdom.57 Moreover, the intensive study and analysis of legal doctrine—
whether in the civil or common law contexts—does not necessarily illuminate or lead to
understanding of the operation of markets for business credit and the potential economic
effects of reforms such as the Modern Principles.
The role of legal elites is, understandably and appropriately, most pronounced in
their defense of (and resistance to modifications of) the local legal culture, and especially
in relation to significant imbedded legal concepts. Inasmuch as security rights as
contemplated by the Modern Principles are proprietary (‘property’ or ‘real’ rights),
doctrinal legal concepts such as the roles of ‘title’ are particularly resilient.58 These
concepts may collide head-on with the Modern Principles in the process of
transplantation (or not).
There are other bases for scepticism of positions taken by legal elites toward law
reform proposals. Practitioners and academics alike may have incentives to resist change.
Practitioners, for example, may benefit professionally (preserving esteem and positions of
respect—‘psychic income’) and financially from opposing reform and preserving the
status quo.59 Imagine a secured transactions ‘regime’ that consists of a complex web of
esoteric and highly conceptual doctrinal meanderings, pock-marked with forks in the road,
detours, and barricades, the corpus of which is comprehensible only with the ‘benefit’ of
circuitous and detail-laden (even pretentious) intellectual histories, which are often
imbedded in lengthy reported judicial decisions that somehow manage to reach some
results (notwithstanding internal inconsistencies and considerable indeterminacy) while
reflecting little consensus.60 Such a regime may enshrine the demand for legal advice at
every turn. It would not be a mere coincidence that legal elites in a jurisdiction whose
law might be so described would be quite resistant to efforts to adopt the Modern
Principles, which would devalue their hard-earned knowledge and experience even
though it would create net benefits for the society in general.
56

See ch 7 (reform in civil law jurisdictions) and ch 16 (reform in common law jurisdictions)
Consider reasons proffered for retaining existing systems under Singapore law, such as changes would
require a “complete overhaul” and current law has “worked well.” See ch 20 (Singapore) , [19, 23].
58
See ch 14 (Thailand) IVB and VB(i) (discussing the determination of third-party effects and strict
standards of identification for property to be transferred) and IV B i, ii, and iii below.
59
This account would be consistent, for example, with the persistence of the complex amalgam of
common-law and statutory rules for secured transactions laws in Singapore. See ch 20 (Singapore) part
IV] (outlining a trenchant critique of current law while concluding that major changes are unlikely).
Compare the relative success of the reform in Pakistan and the proposed reform efforts in Bangladesh in an
environment of similar English and common-law traditions. See ch 19 (Pakistan) and ch 17 (Bangldesh).
60
The style and structure of this sentence seeks to exemplify the point.
57
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Compare that scenario to the actual experience with the development of Article 9
in the US. I will be among the first to concede, lament, and assume part of the blame for
the statute having grown to be far too complex and detailed. But, ultimately, between the
statutory text and the official commentary, it does provide accessible and relatively
certain and reliable answers and guidance. But the point to be made here relates to the
role and approach of the legal elites. The organized bar, the various other law-reform
oriented organizations, and the individual legal experts that have played a significant role
in the development and advancement of Article 9 have consistently sought to foster a
legal regime that provides clear results, a unitary approach to security devices, and
simplified notice filing, while encouraging the use by the business community of
standard forms without the need for day-to-day legal intervention. Whether they
succeeded perfectly is beside the point. The relevant legal elites sought to reduce the
roles of legal experts in the operation, application, and understanding of secured credit
transactions.61
Putting aside the self-interest of legal elites, their roles in the law reform process
also may reflect the interests of their clients. Of course, their clients are entitled to legal
representation in advocating for their interests in the legislative and related processes.
But the matter addressed here is the role of the legal elites who purport to be advocating
for the public interest in their roles as legal experts. What actually amounts to client
advocacy might be mistaken—and sometimes may be intended to be so mistaken—for
neutral and objective ‘expert’ opinions. Perhaps even more insidious, legal elites may
seek to protect their own professional and financial interests by claiming that they are
advocating for a particular interest group, such as unsecured trade creditors.

c) Missing Histories and Tilting at Windmills
Advocating for a change in law and offering a critique of current law often may
be hindered by an inadequate record supporting the adoption of current law and past (and
ongoing) rejection of reforms. Flaws in the relevant reasoning and erroneous factual
premises are difficult or impossible to assess and criticize in the absence of reliable
records of the bases for past decisions and current positions of lawmakers. And rebuttals
of the bases for decisions suffer when the relevant evidence is anecdotal and suspect and
the attribution to lawmakers is unproven. One of the beauties of the harmonization
process within international organizations (and the uniform law process in the United
States) is the availability of reliable evidence of the debates, assumptions, reasoning, and
61

I readily confess to some bias in the assessment. This experience with legal elites in the Article 9 context
offers a stark contrast to the attitudes and behavior of the bar in the United States that specializes in real
estate law. In general the real estate bar tends to be absorbed with retaining state-by-state idiosyncratic
discrepancies in doctrine and practice and, consequently, has been resistant to harmonization efforts.
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decisions. These inadequacies have been a recurring problem in our investigations on the
JBCP.
d) Opposition of Entrenched Interests
As with any proposal for a change in law, opposition to adoption of the Modern
Principles can be expected from those whose interests align with retaining current law.62
For example, the Modern Principles might be thought to encourage competition from
foreign financers and non-bank lenders who might rely on secured lending to compete
with local banks, whose ‘knowledge of the territory’ affords a competitive advantage in
making unsecured loans. Such local lenders with entrenched market positions may also
be concerned about the Modern Principles’ facilitation of the creation and perfection of
senior security interests in favour of other, potentially competing lenders. Similarly,
sellers and other financers of movables that rely on title reservation transactions, which
are effective under existing local law without registration, also may resist and oppose the
unified, functional approaches to security rights under which such title-based structures
would be made effective against third parties only by registration. The general point here
is that financial market participants may view existing legal infrastructures as
advantageous and legacy financers with substantial market shares under existing legal
regimes may be reluctant to embrace change—even if adoption of the Modern Principles
would benefit borrowers and the local economy more generally.63
e)

Sui Generis, Fortuitous, and Hard‐to‐Classify
Factors
In some cases the outcome determinative factors in the law reform process may
be difficult to characterize, random, or wholly fortuitous. While the concerns addressed
here are the impediments to law reforms, obviously such factors also may support the
adoption of reforms as well. One or more particularly influential individuals or
organizations may take a strong position for or against reforms, which may or may not be
based on sound policy arguments.64 Those advocating for changes in law would be well
advised to be alert to these influences.
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See eg ch 14 Thailand IV B (i) (discussing opposition of banks to secured transactions reforms).
Entrenched interests also may advocate for retention or adoption of provisions that would inhibit the use
of secured credit, such as restrictions on the persons entitled to be secured creditors and restrictions on
assignments of receivables. See IIIBiv and vi below.
64
I would note, by way of example, my own role in the development of law in the United States concerning
intermediated securities. See CW Mooney Jr, ‘The Roles of Individuals in UCC Reform: Is The Uniform
Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised UCC Article 8’ (2002) 27 Oklahoma City University Law
Review 553. Note also the role of David Allan in championing the Australian secured transactions law
reform, see D. Brown, ‘Australian Secured Transactions Law Reform’ in L. Gullifer and O. Akseli (eds),
Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policy and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Oregon
2016) 146-7.
63
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ii.

Impediments to adoption of Modern Principles and use of Secured Credit

Some factors may present obstacles to formal adoption of the Modern Principles and also
may inhibit the extension of secured credit even after enactment of Modern Principlesbased laws.
a) Governmental and Regulatory Influences
Governmental policies toward credit may have substantial negative (or positive)
influences on the adoption of legislation incorporating the Modern Principles and on the
extension of secured credit. Prudential regulation of banks that allows a haircut on
reserve requirements for secured loans is a prime example.65 In many jurisdictions the
unavailability of such favourable treatment for loans secured by movables and
receivables—which effectively treats such loans the same as unsecured loans for this
purpose—imposes an obstacle to the adoption of the Modern Principles by denying these
regulatory incentives. That treatment also discourages the extension of secured credit,
whether or not such reform legislation has been enacted.66
Governmental programmes that support small businesses through loan guarantees
also may lessen the motivation that might otherwise exist to reform secured transactions
law by reducing incentives and to extend secured credit. The reduction of credit risk
under such loan guarantee programmes diminishes the benefits to a creditor of taking
collateral, especially if the credit risk can be reduced through loan guarantees at a lower
cost than extending secured credit.67
On the other hand, adoption of the Modern Principles actually could enhance and
complement these guarantee programmes. To the extent that the guaranteed loans would
require security through the operation of Modern Principles-based laws, losses arising out
of borrower defaults—and the costs of such guarantee programmes—could be reduced.
The guarantor could reduce or eliminate its losses to the extent that effective resort to the
collateral were available. Moreover, lenders would build capacity through their
experiences of extending secured (and guaranteed) loans.
Governmental attitudes toward protections for consumers and natural persons
more generally also may influence the use of secured credit. An example is a restriction
65

See eg G Castellano and M Dubovec, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of Secured
Transactions Law Reforms’ (2017) 22 Uniform Law Review 663.
66
Other regulatory treatment also may reduce incentives to take collateral. For example, generous
treatment with respect to the classification of bank loans as non-performing loans may reduce a bank’s
motivation to treat a loan as in default and to commence enforcement steps. See T Hoshi, ‘The Hidden
Risks in Japan’s Financial System’ (Dec. 2011) National Institute for Research Advancement,
http://www.nira.or.jp/pdf/e_opinion4.pdf.
67
See eg ch 10 (Japan) II; ch 13 (Taiwan) III B(discussing government supported guarantees).
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on persons that are eligible to become a debtor or grantor under a secured transactions
law or a law applicable to registration of security rights.68
b)

Financing Patterns—E.g., Single, Dominant
Lenders versus Multiple Lenders

The first-to-register priority rule and the efficacy of broad collateral descriptions
(e.g., ‘all inventory now owned or hereafter acquired by grantor’) permitted by the
Modern Principles makes it possible for a single secured creditor to ‘lock in’ a priority
position. This aspect of the Modern Principles regime might cause resistance to its
adoption by a jurisdiction in which it is customary for a business borrower to maintain
relationships with several lenders of funds. But resistance on that basis would be
unjustified. Multiple lenders of funds who might otherwise have equally ranking
unsecured claims against a common debtor could, under an inter-creditor agreement,
easily share in collateral as secured creditors under a first-to register priority scheme.69
The purchase money security interest exception to the ‘first to file’ priority rule70 also
facilitates diversity of financiers, since an acquisition financier can obtain limited superpriority without an inter-creditor priority agreement. Adoption of the Modern Principles
need not necessarily lead to the prevalence of a single, dominant secured lender to a
borrower.

c) Infrequency of Priority Conflicts
In some jurisdictions priority conflicts—such as those involving a grantor’s
wrongful creation of security rights in favor or more than one creditor—may be relatively
rare.71 This might result from—and reflect—the ethical norms that prevail in the local
legal and business cultures. Such circumstances might support the view that a
registration system providing for public notice of security rights and a corresponding
first-to-register priority rule are not needed. But the relative paucity of outright fraud
does not demonstrate that a registration-priority system that provides certainty is not
worthwhile and should be rejected. This is especially so if the relevant market lacks a
Modern Principles-based secured transactions legal regime and is one in which secured
credit does not play a prominent role. Although adoption of the Modern Principles in that
68

See IIIBv below.
For example, the creditors all could be named as secured creditors in the registration or an agent could be
named as the secured creditor to hold collateral on behalf of all of the creditors.
70
See ch 3 II A (iii) for a brief account of the purchase money security interest rule. See also ch 4 VII.
71
See for example, City of London Law Society, Financial Law Committee, Commentary to Draft Secured
Transactions Code page 97, at http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/storage/2016/07/Draft-Secured-TransactionCode-Commentary-Discussion-draft-July-2016.pdf.
69
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jurisdiction might not ‘revolutionize’ the credit markets, that would not of itself justify
clinging to a creaky and complicated legal infrastructure that is otherwise problematic
and that imposes unnecessary costs on the extension of secured business credit.72

d) Market conditions
Recall that the principal goals of a secured transactions law incorporating the Modern
Principles are the increased availability and reduced costs of credit.73 In a market in
which the cost of credit is extremely low and unsecured credit is perceived to be readily
available, at first blush adopting the Modern Principles might offer little practical appeal.
If the expenses attendant to providing collateral are perceived to be significant, such a
change in law would be that much less attractive. And for small loans to SME borrowers,
such expenses would cause adoption of the Modern Principles to seem even less
appealing. But, of course, a low-interest-rate environment may not always remain such.
Moreover, even under such market conditions there presumably would always be some
subset of borrowers and situations in which personal property collateral would be
necessary or beneficial. Those borrowers and lenders could benefit greatly from laws
that follow the Modern Principles.
e) Reliance on Immovable/Real Property collateral

In a jurisdiction in which business loans typically are unsecured or collateralized
by immovable (real) property, the impact of this circumstance on prospects for adopting
the Modern Principles and for increased reliance on personal property collateral is similar
to that of the low-cost, high-accessibility-of-credit market just described. As explained
there, however, adoption of the Modern Principles nonetheless could be a beneficial step
for such a jurisdiction.

iii.

Impediments to the use of Secured Credit (under current legal systems
and assuming adoption of Modern Principles)

The foregoing discussion considered some circumstances that may discourage
extensions of secured credit even under a prevailing Modern Principles-based legal
regime. This discussion addresses additional impediments to the use of secured credit.
72
73

See V below.
See I above.
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a) Stigma and reputational concerns of borrowers
In some jurisdictions there is a prevailing belief or assumption that obtaining
credit secured by personal property creates a stigma; casting doubt on the financial
stability of a borrower.74 It sometimes is observed that granting personal property
collateral signals a ‘last resort’ for a financially troubled borrower. Doubtless there is
some truth to these characterizations in jurisdictions in which observations confirm this
correlation in fact. Although troubled firms sometimes (or often) provide personal
property collateral, it does not follow that a firm that provides such collateral in fact is
financially distressed. At the margin, however, this potential stigma plausibly could
dissuade a borrower from obtaining much needed credit if it were conditioned on
providing personal property collateral. Further study might shed light on the extent to
which this ‘stigma’ concern merely reflects some vague sense of malaise perpetuated
through repetition or actually is a material impediment to obtaining credit.
b)

Valuation of Movables, Secondary Markets, and
Dispositions on Default: Chicken or Egg?

Underlying the economic potential of the Modern Principles is the core idea that
the value of collateral could be effectively applied toward satisfaction of a secured
obligation upon a debtor’s default. Lenders in some markets harbour substantial
uncertainty about this key assumption, in particular with respect to movables collateral.
For example, some bank lenders report that they lack (in-house) expertise for valuing
movables and that, in any case, a thin secondary market for such collateral makes
recoveries on default uncertain.75 Some of these lenders have no actual experience with
enforcing security rights in movables following a default.
It is unsurprising that there would not be a robust secondary market for movables
collateral following debtor defaults in jurisdiction in which loans secured by movables
are, relatively speaking, infrequently made. That is to say, a thin market may reflect, at
least in material part, a thin market for movables-secured loans—thus presenting the
‘chicken or egg’ conundrum.

74
75

See ch 10 (Japan) VIII B (ii) (in relation to asset-based lending).
See ch 10 (Japan) VIII A
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c)

Role of Insolvency Law and Proceedings:
Use, Abstinence, Treatment of Secured Claims, Impact
on Secured Credit, and adjustments to insolvency laws

In a real sense the ‘acid test’ of security rights is the effectiveness of those rights
in a debtor’s insolvency proceedings.76 As a practical matter such effectiveness may be
the most important context of perfection (third-party effectiveness) of a security right.
But the impact of insolvency effectiveness generally on security rights and of the details
of the treatment of security rights in insolvency proceedings may extend beyond the
actual treatment of actual security rights in actual insolvency proceedings. The potential
treatment serves to bolster the credit enhancing attributes of security rights by increasing
the availability and lowering the costs of credit—precisely the principal goals of the
Modern Principles.77
The treatment of security rights in insolvency proceedings may serve as an
effective means of de facto enforcement. Viewed ex ante, this perception supports the
credit enhancement function of security rights and encourages extensions of secured
credit. For example, in the US financially distressed firms often are the subjects of
Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. Secured claims generally are honoured78 and
secured creditors may proceed with relative confidence that their collateral will be
accounted for and dealt with in a value-enhancing manner. Collateral might be sold in a
sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets as a going business. The insolvency
proceeding provides a forum and mechanism for the valuation and orderly treatment of
secured claims. Secured creditors expect collateral to be available, under court
supervision, and subject to rules designed to protect collateral value. In a jurisdiction in
which resort to insolvency proceedings is not the norm for a financially distressed
business debtor, considerable uncertainty may exist as to the prospective treatment of a
secured creditor’s collateral following a debtor’s financial demise.79 When insolvency
proceedings are the norm for business financial distress orderly dispositions may
contribute to the development or maintenance of a robust secondary market for movables.
In contrast to the situation in the US, this seems to be the case in Japan, where the
incidence of formal insolvency proceedings for distressed debtors is quite small by
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See ch 5.
See UNCITRAL GTE, quoted at fn 11 above; Mooney, ‘Enforcement’, fn 14 above; Mooney, ‘Credit
Enhancement’, fn 7 above.
78
Secured claims might be honored and respected in a variety of ways, such as by disclaimer or
abandonment of collateral to permit enforcement by a creditor outside of an insolvency proceeding,
supervised disposition of collateral in an insolvency proceeding, or valuation of collateral and a distribution
of value under a plan of reorganization.
79
See part IV A iii above (discussing valuation, secondary markets, and dispositions on default).
77
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comparison.80 A robust market for disposition in insolvency proceedings may, in turn,
benefit enforcement through dispositions of collateral outside of insolvency proceedings.
Finally, this discussion of insolvency law might well have been included under
part IV A ii above,81 inasmuch as the insolvency law and related practices in a State also
may represent an impediment to the State’s adoption of the Modern Principles. For
example, the ‘strong’ version of security rights under the Modern Principles might be of
concern if the State’s insolvency law and practice were such that the combination of the
two regimes would erect obstacles to rescue and rehabilitation of distressed debtors. The
more appropriate response to that situation would be to combine the adoption of a
Modern Principles-based secured transactions law with adjustments in the State’s
insolvency laws so as to be more compatible with rehabilitation.82
d) Costs of use and compliance, including complexity
Extensions of secured credit will be discouraged by a legal regime for secured
transactions that is complex, expensive, and difficult to use.83 Examples of such
obstacles are formalities such as collateral description requirements that are complex and
require assistance by legal professionals for perfection and priority of security rights, a
public registry that is inconvenient to access and imposes substantial fees for registrations,
and regulatory constraints that result in significant expenses for valuations of collateral.
Such flaws in the legal and regulatory infrastructure would be substantially ameliorated
by the adoption of Modern Principles-based secured transactions laws.

B. Selected Principles

80

During the January-September 2018 period the number of court filings of business insolvency
proceedings in Japan (an average of 685 filings per month) were about 9.13% of the number of filings in
the United States (an average of 7,495 per month). Trading Economics, Japan Bankruptcies,
https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/bankruptcies; Trading Economics, United States Bankruptcies,
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/bankruptcies. Compare the relative size of each country’s
GDP for 2017, which (in billions of United States $) was 19,390.604 for the United States and $4,872.137
for Japan (about 25.1% of the United States GDP). The World Bank, GDP, Current US,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US.
81
Impediments to adoption of Modern Principles and use of Secured Credit.
82
[Possible xx to ch 5.]
83
See ch 9 (Indonesia) III B (authorities’ formalistic approach and lack of clarity hinders use of current
law), III D (iii) (use of notaries and formalities such as listing values and obligations causes confusion and
unnecessary expense); See ch 12 South Korea IV (discussing complexities and costs of registration system
including requirement that both parties apply, examination by registrar, and registration requirement upon
creation, extinguishment, and other events).
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This subpart considers several of the Modern Principles as compared to the
corresponding treatment (or lack of treatment) under secured transactions laws that
persist unreformed or that have been adopted by selected States. It considers the impact
on these principles of the various challenges and obstacles to transplantation discussed in
Subpart A.
i.

Comprehensive (functional) coverage of all forms of security rights

The Modern Principles embrace a ‘functional, integrated and comprehensive regime’ for
security rights.84 It follows that under the Modern Principles devices such as the
retention of title by a seller and a transfer of title by a debtor to a creditor to secure an
obligation are treated as security rights. As such, they are subject to the other dimensions
of the Modern Principles such as the requirements for creation and perfection and priority
rules, discussed next. It is unsurprising that this clash between substance and economic
reality, as embraced by the Modern Principles, and entrenched form- and label-based
characterizations would trigger shock and resistance from local interests, including legal
elites.85 Legal experts are unlikely to enjoy seeing expertise developed over years of
experience rendered obsolete (although change also may present new opportunities for
the more ambitious and opportunistic). But legal regimes should not exist and persist for
the enjoyment and prosperity of legal elites.
Adoption of a functional, comprehensive regime for security rights also may
attract opposition from those whose practices and business models would be adversely
affected or, at least, inconvenienced (in particular by the imposition of a requirement for
perfection by registration).86

ii.

Perfection by Registration and Priority Rules – in general

The most instrumental of the Modern Principles are the provision for registration in a
public registry as the principal method of achieving third-party effectiveness (i.e.,
perfection) and the corresponding first-to-register priority rule. These rules directly
confront—and would override—parallel rules typically found in both civil law and
common law traditions. For example, pledges of movables typically have required a
delivery and assignments of money claims (receivables) generally have required
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UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 57; see UNCITRAL Model Law, Arts. 1(1) (application of Model Law
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notification to or an acknowledgment by the underlying obligor or other action with
respect to the obligor87
Adoption of a system for public registration of transfers (or notices of transfers)
for security as a method of third-party effectiveness is a good first step. But that move
would not alone meet the registration and priority standards contemplated by the Modern
Principles. For example, if the pre-existing methods of perfection (such as a notification
to or acknowledgement by an obligor on receivables) that do not require delivery of
actual possession or some other form of public notice are left intact and remain available,
and if (under a first-in-time of transfer principle) an earlier transfer made effective under
those methods takes priority over a transfer that is later registered, then the registration
system falls short of the requirements of the Modern Principles. Under such a structure,
for example, a transferee who conducted a search of the registry and found no conflicting
registration nonetheless would find its interest subordinated to an earlier-in-time
(‘secret’) unregistered interest. Such a registration and priority regime fails to satisfy the
essential purpose of the perfection and priority rules embodied in the Modern Principles.
Yet some states, including Japan and Korea, have quite consciously and purposefully
adopted such a regime.88 That adaptation aptly fits the ‘square wheel’ paradigm.
Such a square wheel might be characterized as a ‘compromise’ between
transplanting the Modern Principles (round wheel) and respect for and reliance solely on
traditional methods of effective transfers (skids). To be sure, it is an improvement. This
registration alternative, for example, would allow a transferee of a large number of
receivables to ensure third-party effectiveness (in particular in the transferor’s insolvency
proceeding) without the expense and delay of dealing with multiple obligors. The
approach also appeases the interests of those parties who wish to achieve third-party
effectiveness while avoiding the expense of dealing with the registration system.
Moreover, it may not deviate materially from the Modern Principles in practice. For
example, as discussed above,89 in a given market priority conflicts arising out of a
transferor’s ‘double assignment’ or ‘double financing’ may be so rare that adopting a
first-to-register priority rule would not produce material adverse effects. Similarly, the
adoption of square wheels (or no wheels) on a tiny island where walking is the principal
means of transport may not present a serious practical problem. Stated otherwise, in
some cases the adoption of an absurd rule would do little damage. Even so, it would
remain an absurd rule.
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Although, under the common law, an assignment of receivables is valid even if the debtor is not notified,
see ch 16 IV B.
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This generally describes the situation under Japanese and Korean law. See ch 10 (Japan) V; ch 12 (South
Korea) III C (ii). See also Chapter 18 (India) IV F.
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See IV A (ii) (c) above.
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iii.

Registration (Notice Filing) and Creation: collateral descriptions

Another pillar of the Modern Principles is the ‘notice filing’ aspect of a registration
system. The information to be contained in the registration notice need contain only the
basic information concerning a security right sufficient to put a searcher on notice that the
secured creditor may have a security right in the relevant asset. In particular, the
reference to the collateral in a notice need not be a detailed and specific. As provided in
the registry provisions of the Model Law, ‘[a] description that indicates that the
encumbered assets consist of all of the grantor’s movable assets, or of all of the grantor’s
movable assets within a generic category’ is adequate.90 So, for example, a reference to
‘all inventory now owned or hereafter acquired by grantor’ would be adequate. Such a
general description also would be sufficient in a security agreement for purposes of
creating a security right under the Model Law.91
This approach has been rejected by secured transactions legislation in some
jurisdictions.92 In the case of Japan, one reason given for this rejection is curious.
Requiring more specific descriptions for creation and registration of security rights by
way of title transfers (jōto tanpo) is seen as a protection from so-called ‘overcollateralization’.93 For registration of assignments of movables and claims, in order for
an assignment to cover future, after-acquired property effectively, it is necessary to
provide specificity such as by identifying the location of movables or the source of
claims.94 Adoption of a standard permitting such broad descriptions would (the argument
goes) facilitate the security transfer to a creditor of substantially all of a grantor’s assets.
A specificity requirement makes such broad coverage more difficult (but presumably still
possible) to achieve. If virtually all of the assets of a grantor were covered by a security
transfer, and if the obligation secured were relatively small compared to the value of the
collateral, then the excess value of those assets would be essentially unavailable for use
as collateral to secure credit from other creditors.95 Alternatively, if no such disparity
between a secured obligation and collateral value exists, then it is argued that in some
cases there might be virtually no free assets available for satisfaction of claims of other
creditors in the case of the grantor’s insolvency.
Arguably implicit in this specificity requirement is the assumption that permitting
an easily achieved broad coverage for a security transfer that could make the excess value
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so unavailable would not be in a grantor’s interest. But why should it be assumed that a
market failure exists or would exist that would lead a grantor to agree to such a security
arrangement that would not be in its interest? Similarly, why should it be assumed that it
is necessary to restrict party autonomy by making it more expensive and cumbersome for
a grantor to transfer interests in its property as it may choose? Concrete evidence of the
reasoning behind the specificity requirement, including answers to the questions just
posed, would provide a useful baseline for advancing the debate.96

iv.

Secured creditor restrictions

An example of an entrenched interest opposition to the Modern Principles may be
the adoption or retention of restrictions on the persons eligible to be a secured creditor
and to hold security rights. Such restrictions could inhibit the use of a secured
transactions law, even if it embraced the Modern Principles. Restricting the persons
eligible to receive and hold security rights to entities with market power or that otherwise
benefit from extending credit without relying on modern secured transactions laws could
have adverse economic consequences. Such restrictions could constrain (or fail to
expand) the availability of credit or increase (or fail to reduce) the cost of credit.
However, a State may have legitimate interests in regulating and licensing persons
engaged in the extension of credit to the public. Whether such limitations on holding
security rights are unwise efforts to protect entrenched interests and market positions97 or
legitimate exercises of regulatory power would depend on the relevant facts. If the
former, then such restrictions would implicitly contradict the underlying goals of the
Modern Principles.
For example, limiting the extension of secured credit to bank lenders—i.e.,
deposit-taking institutions—would presumably fall outside of the legitimate regulation of
the extensions of credit. Whether or not a lender is also licensed as a bank (i.e., to take
deposits) would not seem to have any bearing on protecting the public in the context of
commercial loans.98 But legislation enacted in Thailand is not so restrictive. It limits the
use of its secured transactions law to secured creditors that are ‘financial institution[s]’ or
other persons or entities specified by ministerial regulations.99 But for present purposes
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See IV A(i)(c) above (discussing difficulties in rebutting arguments in favor of statutory treatment in the
absence of authoritative evidence of reasoning and policies responsible for its adoption).
97
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the relevant point is that what might appear to be the exercise of legitimate regulation and
supervision by a State might actually amount to the preservation of entrenched market
positions that impedes the goals of the Modern Principles.
v.

Secured debtor restrictions

As discussed above, governmental approaches toward consumer and other natural
person debtors may result in restrictions on the types of persons that could be debtors
under the relevant secured transactions laws.100 As in the case of restricting eligible
secured creditors, this could implicitly contradict the underlying goals of the Modern
Principles to increase access to credit.101 Japan’s PRAMC provides for the use of the
registration system for the perfection of assignments of title of movables and claims only
for assignments made by ‘juridical persons’.102 This relegates assignments by natural
persons to reliance on traditional Civil Code methods of third party effectiveness. Many
SMEs in Japan and, presumably, in other jurisdictions are owned and operated by natural
persons as sole proprietorships and not as companies or other legal entities. It follows
that such restrictions that limit access to the use of secured transactions laws are likely
also to limit access to credit, to increase the cost of credit, or both.103
vi.

Free assignability and anti‐assignment clauses

Specifying the Types of Lender, the secured party may be a juristic person having the objective to involve
in securitization, a trustee of a trust under the law governing trust for transactions in capital market, a
securities firm, a mutual fund, a bondholders’ representative under the law governing securities and
exchange, a juristic person operating a derivatives business, an asset management company, and a juristic
person having the objective to conduct factoring business. Business Security Act, B.E.2558, B.E.2559
(2016). Moreover, under the Ministerial Regulation on Specifying the Types of Lender under the Business
Security Act No.2, B.E.2561 (2018), the secured creditor under the Business Security Act B.E. 2558 may
be the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Industry Ministry dealing with the SMEs Civil
Development Fund, a foreign commercial bank dealing with syndicated loans, a juristic person having the
objective to involve in hire-purchase or leasing transactions, and a juristic person having the objective to
involve in financing transactions. See ch 14 (Thailand) IV B (i). A similar system applies in India (see ch
18 IV A). The Pakistan reformed law is limited in scope to financial institutions or a consortium of
financial institutions, as defined in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, and
does not, therefore, apply to supplier finance.
100
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Another manifestation of entrenched interest resistance to the Modern Principles
is the retention of the legal effectiveness of an agreement between an obligor and an
obligee on a money claim (receivable) that an assignment by the obligee is not
effective.104 Major companies may have sufficient bargaining power to insist that such
provisions are included in their supply contracts (as obligors), which relieves them of any
responsibility to deal with assignees.105 On the other hand, one might think that bank
lenders, who might be interested as prospective assignees, would support the free
assignability in accordance with the Modern Principles. But it also is plausible that some
lenders might oppose free assignability out of concern that their borrowers might
otherwise be more likely to assign receivables to other creditors. These lenders
presumably would be motivated by an interest in preserving their market positions.
Notwithstanding these potential concerns, Japan recently modified its law to provide that
such anti-assignment clauses are ineffective to prevent a valid and enforceable
assignment.106 However, such anti-assignment provisions remain effective as between
the parties, to the end that an assignment would constitute a breach of contract by the
assignor. Thus, a significant disincentive remains to assignments of receivables subject
to such anti-assignment provisions.
vii.

Enforcement following default

The powers typically associated with ‘title’ or ‘ownership’ of property lend
themselves quite comfortably with the exercise of default remedies in secured
transactions. This may explain in part some States’ incentives to retain title-based
secured transactions and to resist the comprehensive, functional scope of the Modern
Principles. This may be further encouraged by what are perceived as cumbersome
procedural requirements for exercise of remedies under statutory schemes for pledges and
mortgages. But the Modern Principles embrace robust rights of enforcement. There is no
principled reason why resort to a title-based device necessarily would offer stronger
remedies (although a creditor’s having ‘title’ may retain a strong intuitive appeal). On
the other hand, if the motivation for retaining title-based devices is to insulate a secured
creditor from reasonable procedures to preserve any surplus value of collateral (i.e., in
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excess of the secured obligation) for the benefit of the debtor, the Modern Principles
simply reject that approach as incoherent and penal.107

C. Some Watsonesque perspectives
The Modern Principles can be transplanted and received well by States that reflect
a range of attributes, thus supporting the idea that they are eminently transplantable. But
questions remain as to the circumstances under which transplantation fails or is seriously
incomplete or deviant. Watson’s Legal Transplants may offer some useful insights as to
appropriate areas of investigation and research. In this respect it supports the thesis of
this chapter that further understanding of law reform processes in general and in
particular those dealing with secured transactions laws would benefit greatly from more
rigorous empirical studies. Our current work on the JBCP follows this path and we hope
that it will be an exemplar for similar investigations.
The experience with transplantation of the Modern Principles provides some
support for Watson’s claim that transplantation of legal rules may be ‘socially easy’.108
This is reflected by their assimilation into a variety of legal cultures and societies. But
the deviations from the Modern Principles that States have made also evidence Watson’s
appreciation that States make reforms to borrowed laws in the transplantation process.
This preliminary examination of the transplantation of the Modern Principles may cast
some doubt, at least in the present context, on Watson’s claim that adjustments do not
conform the States’ particular circumstances (depending, admittedly, on what one
considers to be relevant particular circumstances). At least in this context of modern
commercial law, the dominant influences of legal elites (broadly including not only the
professionals but the legal culture and doctrinal and conceptual influences) and the
political power of entrenched interests do appear to take account of a State’s specific
situations. But these adjustments to local circumstances (or selective rejections of the
Modern Principles) are not necessarily socially beneficial, especially when these two
important influences converge.
Japan’s ‘square wheel’ adaptation of the registration and priority aspects of the
Modern Principles reflects a failure even to incorporate the basic ‘idea’, much less the
details, of a first-to-register priority rule.109 But it may well reflect only a ‘split the
difference’ compromise among various competing local interests—including legal
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elites—which a political process failed to resolve in a principled way. Similarly, efforts
of commercial lenders to protect entrenched market positions, such as resistance to the
effectiveness of anti-assignment provisions, also may reflect an adaptation to the
particulars of local circumstances.110 But those ‘particulars’ might be nothing more that
the protection of a dominant market position. That is not necessarily a ‘cultural
adjustment’ worthy of our applause and respect.
Perhaps Watson’s most compelling claim is that virtually all law is borrowed.
Yet one might quite plausibly wonder, for example, how the rather complete reception by
Holland of Roman law by the 17th century may be relevant to the transplantation of the
Modern Principles in the 21st century. 111 On the other hand, Watson’s explanation of
the more or less fortuitous borrowing of Ulrich Huber’s teachings on conflict of laws in
the early development of laws in the United States seems no less apt when considering
transplantation of the Modern Principles.112 This borrowing appears to have resulted
primarily from the availability of the source and not from any similarity or other affinity
between the donor(s) and the recipient.113
The borrowing phenomenon invites some interesting reflections on the
development of the Modern Principles, and in particular the development of UCC Article
9. To be sure, UCC Article 9 borrowed from ideas developed in the United States and
elsewhere concerning secured commercial financing transactions. But it also offered a
new, sui generis and holistic approach that has inspired and found its way into the
Modern Principles and into the laws of numerous States. UCC Article 9 fundamentally
rejected common law ideas about nonpossessory security. It addressed concerns about
fraud (and to a lesser extent, ostensible ownership) by offering as an antidote a simple
notice-filing system for public notice. It rejected the ‘principle’ that still prevails in some
common-law jurisdictions that even if a transaction walks like a duck, quacks like a duck,
and looks like a duck, it is a chicken if the parties so name it—e.g., title reservation
transactions.114
A relatively small group of scholars and practitioners bore the responsibility, and
deserves the credit, for the successful emergence of UCC Article 9. It was necessary (not
only for Article 9 but for the development of the UCC as a whole) to overcome
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substantial opposition from powerful circles.115 These efforts benefited from the
prevailing uniform law process in the United States, which removed the project from the
usual political environment of the legislative processes. Alas, that is a luxury that is not
available in most States.

D. Overcoming Obstacles
The foregoing discussion of challenges and obstacles to the adoption of Modern
Principles and the use of secured credit also provides a roadmap of sorts for steps and
strategies for overcoming or reducing these impediments. This subpart identifies
examples of positive approaches for overcoming obstacles and advancing the adoption
and use.
i. Capacity Building
The need for capacity building was an important theme that emerged from the
coordination conferences.116 Efforts directed to developing debtor and creditor capacities
to understand and utilize secured transactions could meaningfully address many of the
challenges to the adoption of the Modern Principles as well as the effective extensions of
secured credit.117 For example, a widespread appreciation of the benefits of secured
credit could reduce or eliminate the stigma sometimes associated with security.118
Similarly, education and training of credit personnel and the development of secondary
markets for movables could address valuation problems that inhibit the development of
secured credit markets.119
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ii.

Incentives eg World Bank ‘Doing Business’ rankings

The economic benefits that may result from a State’s adoption of a Modern
Principles-based secured transactions law provide tangible incentives for reform.
Another, less tangible but important, incentive may arise from a State’s desire to improve
a its rankings in the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report.120 In the context of
secured transactions law reforms the rankings on the strength of legal rights in connection
with getting credit are particularly significant.121 While these rankings have been
subjected to considerable (and well-deserved) criticism,122 it is clear enough that
improving a State’s ranking has provided a meaningful incentive for reform.123
iii.

Promotion and coordination

Finally, the past and ongoing work of the many organizations and individuals in
the implementation of secured transactions law reforms deserve much credit for the
progress to date. Many of these were represented at the 2017 and 2018 coordination
conferences.124 One hopes that the current efforts to provide enhanced coordination of
these efforts will provide even more success in the future.

V.

Benefits of Modern Principles: beyond credit enhancement

The potential benefits of adopting the Modern Principles extend beyond the prospects for
increasing access to and lowering the cost of credit. Indeed, in some markets prevailing
conditions, such as exceedingly low interest rates and the prevalence, convenience, and
financial rewards of government-sponsored guarantees, might substantially blunt those
credit enhancement attributes of a Modern Principles-based secured transactions law.
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But even in the absence of any demonstrable and measurable macroeconomic impact of
credit enhancement, there is much to commend the adoption of such reforms.
A Modern Principles-based law offers many laudable attributes—coherence,
relative simplicity, certainty, transparency, and user-friendliness. This is especially so
when compared to the balkanized taxonomies of security devices under both commonlaw and civil-law traditions. These attributes reflected by the Modern Principles typically
are central aspirations of law reform. Yet these advantages appear to occupy a reduced
and subservient status when compared to the more visible and frequently touted goal of
economic growth through enhanced access to and lower costs of credit. It is of course
quite appropriate to recognize and advocate for the potential economic gains from a
Modern Principles-based legal regime. But viewing such law reforms solely from that
perspective holds secured transactions law reforms to an unreasonable, indeed unfair,
standard.

VI.

Conclusion

Further investigation of transplantation processes for secured transactions laws
(including the Modern Principles) may well reveal the weakness, even incoherence, of
arguments supporting the status quo and in opposition to (or favoring deviation from) the
Modern Principles. This exposure may overcome resistance that otherwise would be
successful absent careful public scrutiny. The harmonization processes within
UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and other organizations that have produced the Modern
Principles provide some powerful evidence for this prospect. To be sure, the same
counter-arguments made (and that continue to be made) in the local law reform processes
were heard throughout the harmonization and modernization efforts on the international
level. Open discussion and frank debates exposed, rebutted, and overcame weak and
incoherent positions.125
Maybe—just maybe—reforms of secured transactions laws in some States that
reject one of more of the most fundamental of the Modern Principles are appropriate
adjustments that will, on balance, promote social welfare. Further investigation and
research concerning secured transactions law reforms should, of course, be open to this
prospect. But I am profoundly sceptical. It is likely that the arguments that proved to be
losers in the work on international harmonization and modernization of secured
transactions laws are losers still. As we ponder arguments supporting the need for
adjustments and deviations from the Modern Principles to accommodate the asserted
needs, culture, and particular circumstances of a State considering reforms, we should be
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mindful of the idea underlying the Modern Principles. The international harmonization
effort reached a consensus that the current laws of many States are inferior, ineffective,
and inefficient and should be replaced. Secured transactions laws, like laws in general,
are not created equal. Some work better than others.
But this scepticism about significant deviations from the Modern Principles also
should be tempered in at least two important respects. First, ‘second best’ approach
adopted by a State as a political compromise may nonetheless reflect a substantial
improvement over the legal regime that it replaces. And progress sometimes—often I
would think—proceeds only incrementally and along a winding path. Perhaps the most
important conclusion from Watson’s insights, although not unique, is that the law is
perpetually in a state of flux.126
Second, these principles—while here bestowed with the appellation “modern”—
are (conservatively) more that 65 years old.127 They have seemingly been stubbornly
immune to evolution or modification of a fundamental nature. Even recently emerged
significant artifacts of the Modern Principles—the Guide on the Implementation of a
Security Rights Registry128 and the UNCITRAL Model Law—appear to be oblivious to
the emerging Fintech129 advances, other than embracing 20th century legacy technology
for registries.130 But one hopes that the energy and imagination that infused the processes
that developed and implemented the Modern Principles will emerge and inspire further
evolution and adjustments to these principles. Recent publications that address registries
offer some encouragement in this respect.131
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